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I. INTRODUCTION
When President Truman sought aid to counteract Communist
threats to Turkey and Greece, he called for the United States to " 'sup-
port free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures,' "I and, in the words of Stephen
Ambrose, "[i]n a single sentence . . . defined American policy for the
next generation and beyond."2 For forty years, the overriding goal of
American foreign policy was to prevent the spread of Communism.
The end of the Cold War has led to new responsibilities and differ-
ent challenges. Today, in addition to more customary national security
grounds, other reasons for deploying our forces abroad include the facil-
itation of humanitarian relief, as in the deployment of troops to Somalia,
the promotion of stability through peace-keeping missions, as in the
deployment to Macedonia, and the support of legitimate democratic gov-
ernments against local threats, especially in areas where our national
security interests are at stake.
In the fall of 1994, President Clinton faced a decision whether to
send American forces to Haiti on a mission implicating all of these
purposes-humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and support of democratic
governments-as well as pressing national security concerns. Large
* Assistant Attorney General of the United States for the Office of Legal Counsel and
Professor of Law (on leave) Duke University. Although I assume sole responsibility for this
article, its conclusions emerged from extensive discussions among the Deputy Assistant Attorneys
General who have served with me-Dawn Johnsen, H. Jefferson Powell, Teresa Wynn
Roseborough, Richard Shiffrin and Chris Schroeder-and with the outstanding senior career
attorneys at OLC who have long dealt with war powers issues-Daniel Koffsky and Robert
Delahunty. I am especially grateful to Dan Koffsky for his extensive work on this speech and
article.
1. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, RISE TO GLOBALISM 82 (7th ed. 1993) (quoting President Truman).
2. Id.
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numbers of Haitians were periodically taking to the seas, imperiling
their own lives, and straining our capacity to control our borders. Con-
ditions in Haiti were deteriorating and the military regime was refusing
to keep its promise to return power to the duly elected government. The
President determined that action was required.
Although recognizing the danger inherent in the proposed mission,
the President's senior military advisors concluded that it was far from
clear that a demoralized and ill-equipped Haitian military, if asked to
fight a futile battle in defense of an illegitimate regime lacking popular
support, would provide sustained resistance to American armed forces.
Paramilitary thugs with machetes had been a terrifyingly effective force
against a defenseless civilian population in Haiti. They would have been
substantially less formidable against troops that could call upon the sup-
port of tanks, helicopters, and warplanes. The very size of the planned
American force-approximately 20,000 troops-was purposely
designed to reduce significantly the likelihood of substantial combat
resistance to the deployment in Haiti.
An eleventh-hour accord negotiated by former President Carter,
General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn provided for the entry of
United States forces, the departure of the military regime, and the resto-
ration of Haiti's legitimate, elected government. But in the days before
the agreement was reached, the President asked the Department of Jus-
tice ("Department") to determine whether he would have the legal
authority to order the deployment of American troops into Haiti without
the consent of the military regime and in the face of the de facto
regime's assertion that it would forcibly resist the American interven-
tion. The Department concluded that the President had that authority.
Later, in response to a letter to the President from Senators Bob Dole,
Strom Thurmond, Alan Simpson, and William Cohen, I responded with
an opinion letter setting out the basis of our conclusion. The opinion
prompted a response from ten law professors who disagreed with the
conclusion we had reached.4 One of the ten also published a critique of
the opinion.5
II. A QUESTION OF PROFESSIONAL ROLE
Before offering my thoughts on the professors' response and on the
debate generally, I would first like to address briefly a more personal
3. Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 96, 122-26 (1995).
4. Id. at 127-30.
5. Lori F. Damrosch, The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military
Engagements, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 58 (1995).
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issue concerning the professional role of an academic and the profes-
sional role of an attorney for the executive branch. I have had occasion
to think about this issue often over the last few months. For some of my
friends and former colleagues in academic life, one issue thought worth
debating was the question of what previous positions I had personally
taken on war powers questions while a law professor at Duke and what
position I might have taken on the Haiti issue were I still at a university.
Laurence Tribe, for example, wrote to President Clinton arguing that the
anticipated deployment would be unconstitutional in the absence of prior
congressional authorization, stating "I frankly see no constitutional dif-
ferences between the proposed invasion of Haiti and the one in the Per-
sian Gulf."'6 He pointed out, as did other critics, that as a professor I had
publicly taken the position that prior congressional authorization was
required to render the Persian Gulf War constitutional. Professor Tribe
concluded in his letter to the President that "if Mr. Dellinger were still a
law professor, he would agree on this with me."7 The Washington
Times, in an editorial entitled Where Mr. Dellinger Stands and Where
He Sits, accused me of hypocrisy,8 and in a later editorial asked "Has
Mr. Dellinger changed his views since leaving the academy?" 9
I am by no means convinced that I would have agreed with Profes-
sor Tribe had I been a law professor. I expect that I would have seen a
distinction between the planned deployment in Haiti and the sending of
half a million troops into battle against one of the world's largest and
best-equipped armies. Even apart from that, however, I am not sure I
agree with the apparent assumption of Professor Tribe's letter and the
Washington Times editorial-that it would be wrong for me to take a
different view at the Office of Legal Counsel from the one I would have
been expected to take as an academic. It might well be the case that I
have actually learned something from the process of providing legal
advice to the executive branch-both about the law (from the career
lawyers at the Departments of Justice, State, and Defense and the
National Security Council) and about the extraordinary complexity of
interrelated issues facing the executive branch in general and the Presi-
dent in particular.
Moreover, unlike an academic lawyer, an executive branch attorney
may have an obligation to work within a tradition of reasoned, executive
branch precedent, memorialized in formal written opinions. Lawyers in
the executive branch have thought and written for decades about the
6. Where Mr. Dellinger Stands and Where He Sits, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at A16.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The Democrats and War Powers, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1994, at A20.
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President's legal authority to use force. Opinions of the Attorneys Gen-
eral and of the Office of Legal Counsel, in particular, have addressed the
extent of the President's authority to use troops without the express prior
approval of Congress. Although it would take us too far from the main
subject here to discuss at length the stare decisis effect of these opinions
on executive branch officers, the opinions do count for something."°
When lawyers who are now at the Office of Legal Counsel begin to
research an issue, they are not expected to turn to what I might have
written or said in a floor discussion at a law professors' convention.
They are expected to look to the previous opinions of the Attorneys
General and of heads of this office to develop and refine the executive
branch's legal positions. That is not to say that prior opinions will never
be reversed, only that there are powerful and legitimate institutional rea-
sons why one's views might properly differ when one sits in a different
place.
III. THE LEGAL OPINION
In any event, let me turn to the question of the President's authority
to order the deployment into Haiti. In concluding that the President had
that authority, the Department of Justice relied on three factors. First,
the deployment would accord with the sense of Congress as set forth in
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act." That Act expressed
Congress's view that funds should not be spent for military operations in
Haiti, unless the President made certain findings (such as that the
deployment was justified by United States national security interests)
and reported those findings to Congress.' 2 The President did so. Sec-
ond, the War Powers Resolution,' 3 while not granting any new authority
to the President, recognizes and presupposes existing Presidential power
to deploy armed forces "into hostilities or into situations where immi-
nent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circum-
stances.' 4 By establishing and funding a military force capable of
being sent around the globe, and declining in the War Powers Resolution
or elsewhere to forbid the President's use of his statutory and constitu-
tional powers to deploy troops into situations of risk such as Haiti, Con-
gress left the President both the authority and the means to take such
10. Indeed, as Harold Koh, one of the signatories of the scholars' letter, argued in a recent law
review article, prior opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel should count for a lot. Harold H.
Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15 CAR.ozo L. REv. 513, 516 (1993).
11. Pub. L. No. 103-139, 107 Stat. 1418 (1993).
12. Id. § 8147, 107 Stat. 1418, 1474-75.
13. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1988)).
14. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) (1988).
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initiatives. Third, the Declaration of War Clause 15 did not require prior
congressional approval in the circumstances at issue. Given the nature,
scope, and duration of the deployment, and the consent of the legitimate
government, the President could determine that the deployment would
not constitute "war" within the meaning of the Clause. This made it
unnecessary to address the circumstances where the President would
have the constitutional authority to undertake action amounting to "war"
without congressional approval.16
The ten professors who sent me the letter were unconvinced. They
believed the Department's opinion exaggerated the President's powers.
Other critics, some public, some necessarily private, conversely argued
that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion placed implicit and unwar-
ranted limits on the President's unilateral authority to use force abroad.
1 7
Here, I want to answer at least the professorial criticism.
A. The Declaration of War Clause and the War Powers Resolution
The linchpin of the professors' letter, I believe, was an interpreta-
tion of Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution, which vests in
Congress the power "[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.'
'18
According to the letter, this clause "grants Congress power not simply
'to declare War,' but also to address hostilities in situations short of war,
e.g., through its power to 'grant letters of marque and reprisal.' "19
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
16. It is widely accepted, for example, that the President has authority to use military force to
repel a direct attack on the United States without a congressional declaration of war. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 893 n.l (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of leave
of file bill of complaint); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v.
Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1971). The President's power to use force to rescue Americans
abroad is also well established. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-70 (1890) (among the President's
"rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations,
and all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution" is the
obligation to protect American citizens abroad). In Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186), Justice Nelson wrote that "[i]t is to [the President that] the
citizens abroad must look for protection of person and of property .... Now, as it respects the
interposition of the executive abroad, for the protection of the lives or property of the citizen, the
duty must, of necessity, rest in the discretion of the president." Id. at 112; see also 55 Comp. Gen.
1081, 1084 (1976) ("the President does have some authority to protect the lives and property of
Americans abroad even in the absence of specific congressional authorization"); cf Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873) (including among the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States is the right "to demand the care and protection of the Federal
government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a
foreign government").
17. See Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin Jr., In Constitutional Interpretation, Read the
Framers' Words, LEGAL TImEs, Oct. 3, 1994, at 24, 47.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
19. Nash, supra note 3, at 130.
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Therefore, as the argument goes, "the totality of Congress' Article I, § 8
powers reserves to Congress alone the prerogative and duty to authorize
initiation of hostilities."20 The letter then adds that "it may well be that
the magnitude and scope of [the planned Haiti operation] required prior
congressional approval, without regard to whether the invasion plan con-
templated 'war,' as that term is understood in constitutional or interna-
tional law. ' 21 Finally, the letter denies that "the President alone may
determine that the nature, scope, and duration of a planned military
deployment does not rise to the level of 'war' for which congressional
approval under domestic law is constitutionally required."2
I appreciate that the letter may reflect a range of views. Louis Hen-
kin, for example, had earlier written that "[a]s regards hostilities 'short
of war,' it may be that, although the President can use force if Congress
is silent, Congress can forbid or regulate even such uses of force, if only
on the ground that they might lead to war."23 Perhaps a desire to enlist
the support of those who take such a view accounts for the parts of the
letter referring to Congress' "power ... to address" hostilities short of
war and examining the applicability of the term "war" to the planned
operation in Haiti. At any rate, the approach suggested by these parts of
the letter fundamentally conflicts with the approach suggested by the
letter's statement that the Constitution "reserves to Congress alone the
prerogative and duty to authorize initiation of hostilities, 24 apparently
whether or not those hostilities amount to "war."
The letter seems to argue that the Declaration of War Clause should
be read to cover the full range of instances where United States forces
engage in hostilities short of war. The late Robert Cover once said that
the language "life, liberty, or property" in the Due Process Clause could
have been interpreted (although the Supreme Court chose not to do so)
in the same way we interpret the phrase "heaven and earth" in the Bible:
the language is intended to cover everything, and asking whether there is
something other than "heaven" or "earth" is to miss the whole point.
According to the professors' letter, the Declaration of War Clause
should be interpreted in just this way. By specifying that Congress is to
declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules for
captures on land and water, the argument goes, Constitution gives Con-
gress alone the power to initiate all hostilities, whether or not those hos-
tilities amount to "war" or involve "letters of marque and reprisal" or
concern "captures on land and water."
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 103 (1972) (emphasis added).
24. Nash, supra note 3, at 130.
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The issue, I must emphasize, is not whether the Declaration of War
Clause empowers Congress to regulate uses of force short of war. I
assume that the Clause, together with the Necessary and Proper Clause
and the power over appropriations, confers broad (though not limitless)
authority on Congress to pass legislation governing such uses of force.
Nevertheless, no one, to my knowledge, has argued that Congress had
prohibited the planned operation in Haiti. Even if Congress has the
power to "address hostilities in situations short of war," Congress had
not exercised such power in this case. The scholars' letter, therefore,
must be arguing that the conferral on Congress of power to declare war
and grant letters of marque and reprisal forbids the President from initi-
ating hostilities, even short of war, and even when Congress has not
acted.
For three reasons, I believe this interpretation of the law is not con-
vincing. First, this broad reading of the Clause would lead to the con-
clusion that even deployments not resulting in hostilities require the
prior approval of Congress, but such a conclusion would conflict with a
well-accepted understanding of the President's powers. Second, the
broad reading does not accord with historical practice of presidential
initiation of hostilities short of war. Third, the broad reading conflicts
with the considered judgment of the Congress itself.
First, the President has the well-recognized power to deploy and
redeploy United States forces. By a network of legislation, Congress
has created a large standing army and given the President the means to
send that force all over the world. As Attorney General (later Justice)
Robert Jackson wrote, "the President's responsibility as Commander in
Chief embraces the authority to command and direct the armed forces in
their immediate movements and operations designed to protect the
security and effectuate the defense of the United States. . . . [T]his
authority undoubtedly includes the power to dispose of troops and
equipment in such manner and on such duties as best to promote the
safety of the country."25
Deployments may carry far more risks and be far more consequent-
ial than the granting of letters of marque and reprisal. President
Roosevelt's deployments before the United States entered World War II
could have brought us into that conflict sooner. Since World War II, we
have maintained large forces in Europe, knowing that any attack by the
nations of the Warsaw Pact would cause immediate American casualties
and threaten the world with nuclear war. Deployments may or may not
be so risky that, in the words of the War Powers Resolution, "imminent
25. Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 61-62
(1942).
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involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," but
even where the involvement is not "imminent," the danger may be great.
If the Declaration of War Clause conferred on Congress alone not only
the power to declare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal but
also to initiate all uses of armed forces in between those two points on
the continuum, we would expect that Congress alone could order such
deployments. But past and current practice does not support such a
claim, and the letter from the professors does not, and could not, make
such a broad claim.
Once we accept the President's authority to deploy troops, and rec-
ognize that deployments may be far more consequential than a letter of
marque and reprisal, the argument that the Declaration of War Clause
requires specific congressional approval for any potential engagement in
hostilities short of war falls. The Clause does not cover "heaven and
earth." It covers what it says it covers-declarations of war, letters of
marque and reprisal, and rules for capture. The anticipated deployment
in Haiti was not a rule for capture, it was not a letter of marque and
reprisal, and it was not, in our view, an invasion that amounted to "war"
within the meaning of the Declaration of War Clause.
The constitutional analysis of presidential and congressional power
in this area, therefore, must be directed to identifying the meaning of the
constitutionally-prescribed threshold-"war"--rather than elaborating
upon a requirement that Congress approve the initiation of any "hostili-
ties"-a term found in the War Powers Resolution but not in the Decla-
ration of War Clause. Furthermore, because the President orders the
deployment of troops, he must decide in the first instance whether a
planned operation would be within his authority or whether it would be
"war" in a constitutional sense. The President, along with his legal
advisers, necessarily must determine whether he is obliged to seek con-
gressional approval.
Second, over the course of our history, Presidents have repeatedly
engaged the country's armed forces in hostilities short of war without
prior authorization by Congress. There has been a long, and ultimately
sterile, debate about precisely how many times Presidents have used
force without congressional approval and whether any of these instances
were "wars" in the constitutional sense. Those who seek to limit presi-
dential action argue that "most of these instances were relatively minor
uses of force. 26 But even if this criticism of prior presidential action is
valid, it concedes my point: if the question is whether the President has
any authority, absent congressional approval, to initiate hostilities short
26. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 80 (1990) (footnote
omitted).
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of war, the historical record presents numerous instances in which Presi-
dents have done just that. This does not necessarily mean that a Presi-
dent, where Congress has not spoken, could send one-half million troops
against an entrenched foe, let alone do so in defiance of a congressional
prohibition. It does mean, however, that practice over the course of our
history does not support reading the Declaration of War Clause as deny-
ing to the President the authority to initiate any hostilities short of war.
In the Haiti opinion, the Department was not addressing a decision
to commit troops in a large-scale battle. Indeed, the closest analogues
for the deployment into Haiti were prior instances where the President
used his own authority to order American troops to occupy territory at
the invitation of the legitimate government, into circumstances of some
risk but without an expectation of real resistance. For example, in 1940,
after Denmark fell to Germany, President Roosevelt ordered United
States troops to occupy Greenland, a Danish possession, pursuant to an
agreement between the United States and the Danish Minister in Wash-
ington. In 1941, pursuant to an agreement with the Prime Minister of
Iceland, United States troops occupied that country as well. More
recently, at the request of President Corazon Aquino in 1989, President
Bush authorized military assistance to the Government of the Philip-
pines, which was quelling an attempted coup. Thus, the President's
power to take the action contemplated in Haiti was firmly rooted in long
historical practice. As the opinion said, "[s]uch a pattern of Executive
conduct, made under claim of right, extended over many decades and
engaged in by Presidents of both parties, 'evidences the existence of
broad constitutional power.' -27
We did not suggest in the Haiti opinion that the United States can-
not be said to engage in "war" whenever it deploys troops into a country
at the invitation of that country's legitimate government. Rather, we
believe that a "war" does not exist where United States troops are
deployed at the invitation of a fully legitimate government in circum-
stances in which the nature, scope, and duration of the deployment are
such that the use of force involved does not rise to the level of "war."
The Haiti opinion states that the President, in deciding whether he
needed to seek congressional authorization before deploying troops, was
entitled to take into account not only the anticipated nature, scope, and
duration of the deployment, but also the
antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant
armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result
of the deployment. Indeed, it was the President's hope, since vindi-
cated by the event, that the Haitian military leadership would agree to
27. Nash, supra note 3, at 126 (citation omitted).
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step down before exchanges of fire occurred. Moreover, . .. other
aspects of the planned deployment, including the fact that it would
not involve extreme use of force, as for example preparatory bom-
bardment, were also relevant to the judgment that it was not a
,war. ,28
Third, the proposition that the President has authority to undertake
hostile actions short of war without congressional approval has not just
been the view of the executive branch. Congress itself has implicitly
endorsed it. The War Powers Resolution, passed after long debate and
representing the most serious congressional pronouncement on issues of
war and peace in the past half-century, simply makes no sense unless the
President, at the least, can initiate some hostilities short of war without
prior congressional approval. The Resolution provides that if the Presi-
dent "introduce[s]" United States armed forces "into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances," 29 he must withdraw those forces in sixty days,
unless Congress approves continued engagement.30 If the President
does not have some authority to introduce troops into hostilities short of
war without congressional authorization, the War Powers Resolution has
nothing to operate upon.
In pointing this out, I am not arguing that the War Powers Resolu-
tion itself authorizes such uses of force. The Resolution itself says that
it does not grant such an authorization.3' I am arguing instead that our
mutual understanding of the President's constitutional and statutory
powers should be informed by what Congress, in this critical pronounce-
ment, understood those powers to be. As to uses of force short of war,
the Constitution draws no clear line between presidential and congres-
sional power. It is wholly legitimate, in trying to discern where such a
boundary might be, to look to the practices and decrees of the two con-
tending branches. Where the legislative and executive branches agree,
as the War Powers Resolution indicates they do on the existence of pres-
idential power to initiate at least some hostilities short of war, it takes
more boldness than I have to deny that power altogether.32
In a thoughtful article challenging the Department's legal opinion,
Lori Fisler Damrosch argued that
28. Id. (footnote omitted).
29. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) (1988).
30. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1988).
31. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d) (1988).
32. As the opinion noted, this Administration has not yet had to face the difficult
constitutional issues raised by the provision of the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b),
that requires withdrawal of forces after 60 days involvement in hostilities, absent congressional
authorization.
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the [War Powers Resolution] does not create or assume authority in
the President to introduce troops into hostilities without congressional
approval, but it does provide a procedural framework for responding
to hostilities initiated by others, as in the case of attacks on U.S.
forces deployed outside the United States. In other words, the [War
Powers Resolution's] time periods become relevant where hostilities
have erupted not because the President took a premeditated and unau-
thorized decision to initiate them, but because another party has
attacked U.S. troops deployed overseas in a noncombatant or defen-
sive posture ......
This argument, however, conflicts with the language of the War Powers
Resolution. The Resolution starts a sixty-day clock when "United States
Armed Forces are introduced... into hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circum-
stances."34 Professor Damrosch would limit the Resolution to situations
where United States forces are not "introduced" at all, but are already in
place. The Resolution will not bear such a constricted interpretation.
B. Department of Defense Appropriations Act
As I noted, the Department's opinion focused on three factors, and
I have now covered two of them-that the planned deployment would
not have been a "war" in the constitutional sense and would have been
consistent with the understandings embodied in the War Powers Resolu-
tion. The final factor is the sense of the Congress, expressed in the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, that funds not be spent for
military operations in Haiti unless the President made certain findings
and reported them to Congress. The letter from the professors argues
that the sense-of-Congress provision does not expressly authorize any-
thing and that, in any event, implied congressional authorization for
warmaking is insufficient. It further argues that the provision was
passed when President Aristide might have returned under the Gover-
nors Island agreement and was aimed at the "limited peacekeeping" then
contemplated. Thus, the provision could not be relied upon in the
changed factual circumstances months later.35 Professor Damrosch
expanded on this argument, contending that "the most that section 8147
[of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act] can be taken to
authorize is the kind of limited peacekeeping that was actually contem-
plated in the fall of 1993, not the major change in concept that moved to
the policy agenda only in the summer of 1994."36
33. Damrosch, supra note 5, at 64.
34. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) (emphasis added).
35. Nash, supra note 3, at 128-29.
36. Damrosch, supra note 5, at 61.
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The language of the provision, however, was ample to cover the
planned deployment in 1994. Section 8147, after all, referred to the
"United States military operation in Haiti."' 37 Furthermore, even if an
implied authorization to fight a "war," by itself, might not carry much
weight, I have already explained why the deployment into Haiti would
not have been a "war" in the constitutional sense. In these circum-
stances, it was entirely fair to rely upon the sense-of-Congress
provision.38
IV. CONCLUSION
The analytical approach to the use of force reflected in the Haiti
opinion has been subject to a variety of criticisms. While some in the
academic community were disappointed with what they saw as the per-
missiveness of the opinion, some of my colleagues in government found
fault with what they perceived to be its restrictiveness. The opinion
implicitly acknowledges that there are significant limitations on the
President's ability to deploy our military forces into hostilities by impos-
ing the requirement that he make specific determinations about the
scope, nature, and duration of the deployment before deciding that it
falls within his constitutional authority to act without congressional
authorization.
Admittedly, this approach means that we must be more cautious
about making dogmatic judgments as to the constitutionality of proposed
uses of force. Admittedly, this approach is more tied to facts than other
approaches. Admittedly, this approach recognizes that these are gray,
rather than black and white, issues. Nonetheless, it best strikes the
proper balance between the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief
and Congress' power to declare war. Additionally, it formalizes the
important role that custom and practice must play in divining the reach
of Presidential power in this area.
Today we must understand the constitutional division of authority
between the President and Congress with respect to the use of the armed
forces in light of evolving modem day realities concerning the multi-
varied uses of military force. Numerous factors, including our wealth,
37. Section 8147, 107 Stat. at 1474.
38. Some of the participants in the University of Miami Symposium who strongly support the
1973 War Powers Resolution defend the wisdom of having Congress, by a determination made
more than two decades ago, control current military activities in circumstances that could not then
have been foreseen. In light of this, some of their criticism of our reliance on section 8147 of the
Defense Appropriations Act struck me as somewhat ironic. Faced with an actual legislative act of
Congress, they seemed to wave it away with the suggestion that Congress did not really mean
what it said and, in any event, it was "way back" in October 1993 that Congress had addressed the
issue of the use of military forces in Haiti.
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the security of our borders, the spread of democracy, and the reduction
of tension between the United States and other major powers, have freed
our military forces to play a significant role in the protection of a
broader range of national security interests. This means that our military
is being utilized in ways unknown to, and unforeseen by, the framers.
That is not to say that the principles important to the framers in setting
the balance between the President and Congress cannot inform the con-
stitutional choices that must be made today, or that we must ignore more
than two hundred years of interaction between Presidents and Con-
gresses on these questions. Quite the contrary. In asking the President
to examine the nature and effect of his intended actions, and not just
whether the actions constitute "war" as it was understood in colonial
times, we remain true to the purposes of reserving to Congress' judg-
ment whether to commit the nation to "[t]he violent destruction of life
and property incident to war" 39 while respecting the broad and necessary
powers afforded the President as Commander-in-Chief.
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Charles A. Beard ed., 1948).
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